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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UT'AH
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY,
a corporation,
Plaintiff, Appellant and
Cross Respondent,
-vs.L. V. SHIRE, doing business as
Shire Motor Company,
Defendant,

Case No.
7299

BANK OF VERNAL,
Garnishee, Respondent and
Cross Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

COMMENT ON RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT
OF FACTS
Respondent has filed a Cross Appeal and has made
a lengthy statement of facts in its Brief. Appellant
contends that the facts essential to a determination of
the controversy before this Court are set forth in Appellant's original Brief and that much of the detail set
out by Respondent is irrelevant, immaterial and super1
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fluous. Appellant specifically controverts certain portions of Respondent's Statement of Facts as follows:
(a) Appellant controverts the statement on Page
6 of Respondent's Brief "on the same day accounted
for the minimum sale price of one of the Frazer cars",
and the statement in the same paragraph as follows:
"On January 6, 1948, he accounted for the minimum
sale price of a second Frazer car", and the statement
on Page 7 : ''Shire accounted for the third Frazer car
listed in the Trust Receipt". Anything more than that
payments were made on Shire's indebtedness to the
Bank in the amounts set forth is a mere conclusion of
Respondent.
(b) Appellant controverts the last paragraph on
Page 8 ending on the first two lines on Page 9. More
will be said concerning this in discussing Respondent's
Specification of Errors Nos. 2 and 3.
ARGUMENT
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 1
Respondent contends the Court. erred in not granting its Motion for a Non-suit upon the ground that
Appellant failed to show that Shire had not authorized
or consented to the Bank's making charges upon his
account. Appellant proved that Shire had on deposit
with the Bank $2783.17 on February 13, 1948, and
$2605.00 on February 21, 1948, and that his account was
charged by the Barnk with said amounts on said dates
(Tr. 12 and 13). Appellant also proved that the entire
amount of the $2783.17 was applied to the $11,270.00
2
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note which was secured and that $805.00 of the $2605.00
was credited by the Bank on the $1500.00 note which was
secured. If the Bank had obtained authority or consent
from Shire to the making of such charges, such was a
matter of defense and not a part of Appellant's case.
The pleadings in a Garnishment action are limited by
Statute (Section 104-19-11). Although there is no pleading as such the Bank in fact relies on the doctrine of'
set-off, which is an affirmative defense. Appellant's
situation is not unlike that of a suit by a depositor
against a bank for the balance of his deposit. In such a
case the depositor makes a prima facie case upon proof
of a debt owing by the bank and is entitled to recover
the whole amount, but for the proof by the bank of a
valid set-off. (See Zollman on Banks and Banking, Vol.
7, Page 188).
The question of whether or not Shire authorized or
consented to the charges made by the Bank was entirely
within the knowledge of the Bank. For Appellant to
prove there was no such authority or consent would be
requiring it to prove a negative, the facts of which are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the Bank. This the
law does not require the Appellant to do. The general
rule is stated in 31 C. J. S., Pages 721-2:
"It is very generally held that, where the
party who has not the general burden of proof
possesses positive and complete knowledge concerning the existence of facts which the party
having that burden is called on to negative, or
has peculiar knowledge or control of evidence as
to such rna tters, the burden rests on him to produce the evidence, the negative averment being
3
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taken as true unless disproved by the party
having such knowledge or control.''
The text is supported by the cases therein cited,
and particularly by the following: Hooper v. Talbot,
175 N. E. 783, 343 Ill. 590. Speas v. Merchants' Bank &
Trust Co. of Winston-Salem, 125 S. E. 398, 188 N. C.
524. Guaranty Life Insurance Company vs. Nelson, 101
Pac. 2d 627, 187 Okl. 56.
Appellant having shown that on the date of the
Garnishment, Shire had funds on deposit, except for the
Bank's claim thereto, it was encumbent upon the Bank
to show it had a right to the use of those funds. Ther~
fore the Court did not err in denying Respondent's
motion for a non-suit.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR NOS. 2 and 3
Respondent contends the Court erred in finding
that the two charges in question made by the Bank were
without any authority from Shire. The testimony of
Mr. Meagher clearly shows that instead of Shire authorizing the charging of his account as contended for by
Respondent, he refused to give such authority. Mr.
Meagher testified as follows (Tr. 51):
''I asked him two or three times for a check
on this one car, and he said, 'No, I don't know
exactly how I stand, and I need a little money
to go to Salt Lake on; but it will be all right
Monday.'
''Then I said: 'All right. I will expect payment for these cars Monday.'
''He said : 'I will be back here Monday-if
not Monday, at the latest, Tuesday.'
4
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"I said: 'All right, you will clear up the
whole line Y'
~"He said: 'Yes.' "
In the afternoon of the same day the conversation
between ~Ir. Meagher and Shire of Friday, February 6,
1948, came up again, and l\Ir. Meagher again testified
to substantially the same thing. Upon being asked for
a check to clear up the account Mr. Meagher testified
that Shire said:

''I have the money in the bank, but I would
rather not give you a check because I have a few
little checks outstanding; but I will pay you for
that on J\fonday, when I discount all these contracts in Salt Lake." (Tr. 54)
It was only after a recess over night and upon the
third time that l\Ir. Meagher was called to the stand
that in response to a leading question from counsel he
testified that Shire said it was 0. K. for the Bank to
charge his account with the amount of the Frazer and
the parts on Monday, February 9, 1948. (Tr. 109.)

When this matter again came up in connection with
the cross examination of Mr. J\feagher the statement of
the Court and the understanding of Mr. Critchlow are
helpful (Tr. 125):
"The Court: Maybe this would be helpful:
My understanding of his testimony was that he
asked him if he could charge his account and he
said he had some checks outstanding that he
would go to Salt Lake and bring the money back
Monday or Tuesday.
'' l\Ir. Critchlow: That is my understanding
of it.
''The Court : I did not understand that he
5
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authorized the defendant, or anybody else, in
any way to withdraw from his checking account,
but he wanted him not to withdraw, because he
had some outstanding checks.''
Mr. Meagher's ''after-thought'' concerning the
authority from Shire to make a charge on Monday fades
into comparative insignificance in view of his prior testimony referred to above and in face of the fact that no
charge was made until Friday, the 13th.
This being a law case this ,Court is bound by the findings of the trial Court if there is any competent evidence
to support them. Harper vs. Tri-State Motors, Inc. 90
Utah 212, 58 Pac. 2d 18; Vadner, vs. Rozelle, 88 Utah 162,
45 Pac. 2d 561; Van Leeuwen, vs. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521,
5 Pac. 2d 714; In re Knight's estate, 105 Utah 130, 141
Pac. 2d 879. The findings of the Court are not only supported by competent evidence, but by the weight of the
evidence.
Respondent claims that it had the right without
Shire's authority, to charge his account for the Frazer
car which was sold, because, so Respondent contends, the
proceeds from the sale of the car were to have been held
in trust for the Bank and at the time of the charge were
not secured. This argument begs the whole question of
the law suit. Appellant maintains that so long as any of
the cars included in the trust receipt and chattel mortgage securing the $11,270.00 note were unsold that the
note and trust receipt were secured. The Bank had one
of the Frazer cars included in the trust receipt and chattel
mortgage on hand and unsold at the time of Garnishment
(Record Page 9).

6
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Respondent claims that the deposit made on February 14, 1948, (the deposit slip is dated February 13, 1948,
Exhibit "H") was intended by Shire to be applied on his
indebtedness to the Bank. The evidence does not support this contention. The evidence on the contrary shows
that a deposit slip was made out for the items involved,
(Exhibit "H") which bears the initial "W", a Teller
by the name of Winkel at the Bank (Tr. 75) and the
figures $2564.00 in two places, are those of Mr. Winkel.
Exhibit'' AA'' shows that the sum of $2564.00 was credited by the Bank to Shire's account on February 14, 1948.
These being the facts there can be no inference that Shire
intended this sum to be used to pay his debts to the Bank.
It is more logical to assume he sent the funds for deposit
to cover his outstanding checks. He was more greatly
concerned about his outstanding checks than his indebtedness to the Bank, as is borne out by refenences made by
both Appellant and Respon~ent to the testimony of Mr.
Meagher concerning what Shire said about his checks.
In any event here again not only competent evidence on
this point, but the weight of the evidence supports the
finding of the trial Court.
Appellant conceeds that the bank had the right to
apply $1800.00 of the $2605.00 charged against Shire's
account to the payment of the $2065.00 unsecured note.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.4
The Court did not err in failing to find that the
minimum sale price of each of the Frazer cars in the
Trust Receipt was $2504.84. Whether such was the agreement is not a material issue raised by the pleadings, and
7
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is not an ultimate fact essential to a determination of the
controversy. This Court has held that findings should
be limited to the ultimate facts to be ascertained. Fuller
vs. Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 Pac. 790; J ankele vs, Texas
Company, 88 Utah 325, 54 Pac. 2d 425.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 5
Respondent contends the Court erred in not quashing the Writ of Garnishment on the ground that the
claims of Appellant sued upon were secured. The Appellant's suit against Shire consists of three Causes of
Action, each based upon an unpaid check. The First
Cause of Action was for a check in the amount of $3230.69
(Record 1) the Second Cause of Action was for a check
in the amount of $509.08 (Record 2) and he Third Cause
of Action was for a check in the amount of $100.00
(Record 3). There can be no question but what the
Appellant was entitled to a Garnishment on the Third
Cause of Action for the reason that the check f«;>r $100.00
was never secured. Appellant merely cashed the check
for Shire as an accommodation (Tr. 91). The Appellant
entered into a ''Floor plan'' arrangement with Shire
wherein it financed the purchase of four automobiles: A
1942 DeSoto and a 1941 Ford were the subject of one
transaction evidenced by a Trust Receipt (Exhibit "3")
and another trust receipt was executed for two 1948
Frazer automobiles (Exhibit "4"). Shire paid for the
Ford automobile by a check in the amount of $850.00 on
February 2, 1948, at which time Appellant gave him a
receipt, (Exhibit "I") and delivered to him the Title
Certificate for the automobile. (Tr. 128). On February

8
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9, 1948, Shire delivered to Appellant his check for $509.08
('vhieh check i~ the subject of Appellant's Second Cause
of Action) and which was credited one-half to each car
in Exhibit •'-!' ', and Shire was given a receipt for said
amount (Exhibit ''J", Tr. 129-130). Universal C. I. T.
paid one-half of the balanee on Exhibit "4" to pay for
one of the Frazer automobiles (Tr. 130). On February
12, 1948, Shire gaYe Appellant his check for $3230.69
(whieh is the subjeet of Appellant's First Cause of
Action) and which was given to pay for the other Frazer
automobile in Exhibit "4" and for the DeSoto in Exhibit
"3' '. At that time Appellant gave Shire a reeeipt for the
amount of the check and delivered to him the Title Certificate for the DeSoto automobile (Tr. 130-131). At said
time Shire reported to Appellant that he had sold the
remaining Frazer automobile listed in Exhibit "4". The
Frazer automobile was a new car; and had not been
registered and no title certificate had been issued therefor. Appellant held no title doeument whieh Shire needed
to effect the registration of the automobile. The evidence therefore is to the effeet that the two trust receipts
were paid in the manner above set forth.
Th Trust Receipt, Exhibit "4", eontains the following provision:
"So long as Trustee is not in default hereunder, Trustee may in the regular course of his
business sell said vehicles for cash, or on terms
approved in advance by Entruster, for not less
than the minimum sale price hereinabove set opposite said respective vehicles, plus a pro-rata
part of all accrued interest and eharges hereunder. Trustee agrees in case of each sale to hold
9
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in trust for Entruster the proceeds of such sale,
together with any vehicle taken in trade, separate
from his funds and property, and immediately
to pay over and deliver said proceeds and trade
vehicle to Entruster.''
The amount owing on the trust receipt was not due
until February 29, 1948, therefore Shire was not in default and had a right to sell the automobiles described
therein. Upon a sale of said automobiles according to the
terms of the trust receipt they were no longer secured
by the trust receipt, but in lieu of the security the Trustee
was obligated to hold the funds in trust for the Appellant.
In other words, Shire was a trustee with the power to
sell, and upon sale was obligated to account to Appellant,
but Appellant did not have the right to follow the automobiles which were sold in the regular course of busines·s
into the hands of a purchaser from Shire, but was limited to his right to require Shire to account for and pay to
Appellant the minimum sale price of the automobiles
listed. As authority for this contention the following
cases are cited: Peoples Finance and Thrift Company of
Visalia, vs. Bowman, 137 Pac. 2d 729 Cal., which holds
as follows:
"A buyer of an automobile from a dealer was
a buyer in the ordinary course of trade and obtained good title to the automobile free from the
lien of the trust receipt."
See also Colonial Finance Co. vs. DeBenigno, 7 Atl. 2d
841, 125 Conn. 626 ; General Finance Corporation, vs.
Krause 1\tiotor Sales, 23 N. E. 2d 781, 302 Ill. App. 210.
The purchaser of the Frazer automobile from Shire
took the same free from any lien of the Appellant. The
10
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Fniform Trust Rereipt Aet, lf>-!3 Session Laws, PagPs
255-6, reads as follows :
'· "\Vhere the trustee, under the trust receipt
trausaetion, has liberty of sale and sells to a
buyer in the ordinary course of trade, whether
before or after the expiration of the thirty day
period specified in subsection 1 of Section 8 of
this act, and whether or not filing has taken place,
such buyer takes free of the entruster's security
interest in the goods so sold, and no filing shall
constitute notice of the en truster's security interest to such a buyer."
Respondent contends that Appellant's theory defeats its right to a Garnishment. This is not so. There is
a difference between the relationship between the Bank
and Shire and that of Appellant and Shire. The $1500.00
note held by the Bank was secured by a chattel mortgage which was not foreclosed until after the Garnishment. The $11,270.00 note was secured by a chattel mortgage on five Frazer automobiles. The Bank also held a
trust receipt on the same automobiles. The chattel mortgage was never foreclosed and the Bank had in its possession one of the automobiles so secured at the time of
the Garnishment, which had not been sold. There can be
no question but what the $1500.00 note was secured at the
time of the Garnishment. We are aware of no way the
bank can avoid the effect of the chattel mortgage on the
five Frazer automobiles, but if in some unknown way
it can be said that the Bank elected to forget the chattel
mortgage and rely on the trust receipt, yet at the time of
the Garnishment the Bank still had one of the automobiles
included in the trust receipt in its possession which remained unsold. So long as the mortgage was not fore11
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closed and any of the automobiles remained undisposed
of, the note and trust receipt were secured. On the other
hand, all of the automobiles described in the trust receipts
held by Appellant had been sold prior to the commencement of the action. The trust receipts had been paid in the
manner set forth in the testimony of Mr. Brothers (Tr.
130). The security was no longer available to Appellant,
as heretofore discussed. Appellant's suit is based upon
three checks, payment for which was refused by the Bank,
and which were not secured.
A sufficient answer to the discussion with respect
to the Milan Rogers contract on Pages 32 and 33 of Respondent's brief is that if Respondent considers that it
has an interest in the automobile, then such should be
asserted against the automobile itself and not against the
Appellant who is a purchaser of a contract for the sale
of the same at Execution Sale.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 6
The sheriff attached the interest of Shire in the
Frazer automobile at a time when it was in possession of
the Bank (Record 24-25). The attachment was made pursuant to Section 104-18-11. The liability of the Bank is
governed by Section 104-18-12. Under this section, if the
Bank chose to retain possession of the automobile there
is no reason why Appellant should be charged with
storage. The Sheriff did not take possession of the car.
The attachment did not prevent the Bank from disposing
of the automobile, but if the Bank chose to retain possession it should bear the cost of storage. There is no basis
for the chargin,g of storage against Appellant at all. In
12
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any event, the Court determined $35.00 was a reasonable
storage. If there was error it was in allowing the Bank
any storage at all.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO.7
The Court did not err in awarding costs to Appellant. In its Answer of Garnishment the Bank denied
that it was indebted to Shire in any amount (Record 9).
The trial Court held that the charges made by the Bank
on Shire's account were unauthorized. Therefore, the
Bank's Answer was successfully ''controverted'' and
costs were rightfully awarded to the Appellant pursuant
to the sections of the statute quoted by Respondent.
SPECIFICATION OF ERROR NO. 8
There was no error in refusing to admit Respondent's proposed Exhibit "10." The date of the Exhibit,
which is a letter, in April 2, 1948. The rights of the
parties are to be determined as of February 24, 1948, the
date of the service of the Writ of Garnishment. Whatever
action the Bank took thereafter in attempting to dispose
of its security under the trust receipt has no bearing
upon the issues before this Court.
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF
The only point raised by Respondent which was not
discussed by Appellant in its original Brief is concerning
Section 104-19-18. It would seem that this section has no
application here, as Appellant seeks by this action to
Garnishee the funds of Shire in the Bank and has not
attempted to take possession of the mortgaged property
13
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from the Bank. We see no way that Respondent can
gain comfort in seeking help from Section 104-19-18 in an
interpretation of Section 104-19-13, as Section 104-19-18
covers an entirely different situation.
CONCLUSION
We therefore respectfully submit that the Court did
not err in the manner contended for by the Respondent,
but respectfully urge this Court to set aside the Conclusions of Law and Judgment of the Trial Court and to
make Conclusions of Law and Judgment in favor of the
Appellant and against Respondent for the amounts charged by the Bank against the Defendant Shire's, account
and which were applied on its secured indebtedness.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY AND BOYER,

Attorneys for Appellant
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